Keeping \u3cem\u3eGideon\u3c/em\u3e\u27s Promise: Using Equal Protection to Address the Denial of Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases by Buskey, Brandon & Lucas, Lauren Sudeall
Georgia State University College of Law
Reading Room
Faculty Publications By Year Faculty Publications
4-2017
KeepingGideon's Promise: Using Equal Protection
to Address the Denial of Counsel in Misdemeanor
Cases
Brandon Buskey
American Civil Liberties Union
Lauren Sudeall Lucas
Georgia State University College of Law, lslucas@gsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/faculty_pub
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal
Procedure Commons, and the Fourteenth Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications By Year by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brandon Buskey & Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Keeping Gideon's Promise: Using Equal Protection to Address the Denial of Counsel in




KEEPING GIDEON’S PROMISE:  
USING EQUAL PROTECTION TO ADDRESS 
THE DENIAL OF COUNSEL 
IN MISDEMEANOR CASES 
Brandon Buskey* & Lauren Sudeall Lucas** 
 
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants the right to counsel, and the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear 
that right is applicable to all defendants in felony cases, even those unable 
to afford a lawyer.  Yet, for defendants facing misdemeanor charges, only 
those defendants whose convictions result in incarceration are entitled to 
the assistance of counsel. 
The number of misdemeanor prosecutions has increased dramatically in 
recent years, as have the volume and severity of collateral consequences 
attached to such convictions; yet, the Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence 
in this area has remained stagnant.  Critics of the doctrinal and pragmatic 
problems created by the Court’s actual incarceration standard have 
advocated for various reforms to better protect people accused of 
misdemeanors, including redefinition or expansion of the right to counsel 
and legislative changes that would cut back on incarceration and allow 
states to better apportion their limited resources among defendants. 
This Article offers a novel perspective, grounded in due process and 
equal protection and a line of Supreme Court cases that guarantee equal 
access to the courts.  Viewed in that light, indigent misdemeanor defendants 
denied counsel may not suffer from a Sixth Amendment violation under the 
law as it stands, but they are deprived of meaningful access to the courts on 
the basis of wealth.  It suggests that reconceputalizing the plight of 
misdemeanor defendants through the lens of due process and equal 
protection may help to identify the most effective judicial and legislative 
solutions to the crisis of “assembly line justice.” 
  
 
*  Senior Staff Attorney, ACLU Criminal Law Reform Project. 
**  Assistant Professor, Georgia State University College of Law; Faculty Director, Center 
for Access to Justice.  We are grateful to Teresa Enriquez, Charlie Gerstein, Norman 
Lefstein, Alexandra Natapoff, John Rappaport, and Norman Reimer for their help and 
thoughtful feedback on earlier drafts of this piece. 
 
2300 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 2300 
I.  THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MISDEMEANOR CASES ............................ 2305 
A.  The Right to Counsel as Currently Defined ............................ 2305 
B.  How Scott Misconceptualized the Role of Counsel in 
Misdemeanor Cases .............................................................. 2308 
II.  POTENTIAL FIXES—AND THEIR FLAWS ............................................ 2320 
III.  EQUAL PROTECTION:  AN ALTERNATIVE PATH ............................... 2327 
A.  Equal Protection and Access to the Courts ............................ 2329 
B.  Equal Protection and the Right to a Lawyer in Misdemeanor 
Cases ..................................................................................... 2333 
C.  Toward an Equal-Protection-Driven Solution ....................... 2336 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 2339 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 31, 1972, Aubrey Scott walked into a Chicago criminal 
courthouse, alone and unrepresented by an attorney.1  The purpose of the 
proceeding was to determine whether there was probable cause to charge 
Scott with petty theft for shoplifting eleven days earlier at an F.W. 
Woolworth Company store.2  But there was a misunderstanding:  when the 
court asked Scott if he thought that he was going to be ready for trial,3 Scott 
took this to mean if he was ready for trial right then, and he replied that he 
was.4  The prosecution answered in kind, and the court, seeing no need for 
delay, asked Scott to enter a plea.5  Scott pleaded not guilty.6  He then 
waived a jury trial.7  No one bothered to inform Scott that he had a right to 
counsel, whether or not he could afford one.8 
Things moved quickly from there.  At trial, a Woolworth’s security guard 
testified to what he believed was Scott’s heist of an attaché case:  a scheme 
that required having a salesperson unlock the attaché case for him, followed 
by Scott walking around the store for fifteen to twenty minutes with a ten-
dollar bill in his hand, all while passing several other salespersons from 
whom he could have made the purchase.9  The guard testified that after 
seeing this, he walked out of the store through the main entrance, and Scott, 
still holding the attaché case, walked out of the same door a few minutes 
later.10  According to the guard’s testimony, he then ordered Scott back into 
the store, at which point Scott claimed the case was his.  A few of Scott’s 
 
 1. See People v. Scott, 343 N.E.2d 517, 518 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 369 N.E.2d 881 
(1977), aff’d, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. at 519. 
 10. See id. 
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personal belongings were in the case, which cost $12.95.11  Scott did not 
cross-examine the officer. 
Scott testified next.  He claimed that he placed his belongings in the case 
to see if they fit, which they did.12  He explained that he walked around the 
store to find the salesperson that showed him the case, but she was no 
longer there because that was not her usual post.13  Scott stated that he was 
partially blind and could not find the salesperson after she left.14  According 
to Scott, the security guard then came into the store from the main entrance 
and accused him of shoplifting.  Scott denied any wrongdoing and showed 
the officer the money in his hand.15  A second officer arrived, grabbed 
Scott, and the guards called the police.16 
After Scott’s testimony, the prosecution rested.17  The court then asked 
Scott how much money he had with him that day and whether he offered to 
pay anyone.18  Scott replied that he had $300 on him that day and reiterated 
that the $10 was for the salesperson.19  The court was unmoved.  It flatly 
declared, “I don’t believe you, sir.  Finding of guilty.”20  During sentencing, 
the prosecutor informed the court that Scott’s most recent offense was 
another petty theft conviction from fourteen or fifteen years prior.21  
Though Scott faced up to a year in jail,22 the court instead fined him $50, 
which was promptly paid from Scott’s earlier bail of $100.23  Scott did not 
spend a day in jail. 
These circumstances raise a critical question:  Did Scott receive a fair 
trial?  To answer that question, it is worth considering that, by the end of 
the trial, Scott had likely been deprived of (1) his constitutional right to a 
jury trial,24 (2) his constitutional right to an attorney at a preliminary 
hearing,25 (3) his constitutional right to cross-examine the state’s witness,26 
(4) his constitutional right against self-incrimination in testifying on his 
own behalf,27 and (5) his constitutional right to any exculpatory evidence.28 
Despite these deprivations, for many, the stronger intuitive factor would 
be whether Scott had a viable defense.  Things appear less promising for 
 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id.  The prior offense could have exposed Scott to a sentence between one and 
five years. Id. at 520.  But because the prosecution did not allege the prior conviction in the 
complaint, perhaps inadvertently, Scott did not face the enhancement. Id. at 520 n.1. 
 23. See id. at 519. 
 24. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161–62 (1968). 
 25. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970). 
 26. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). 
 27. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
 28. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
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Scott on this front.  The security guard’s account is straightforward and 
damning, and, by comparison, Scott’s version is self-serving and 
implausible.  That is, until one confronts an issue that the court (and Scott) 
neglected to examine:  Why did the security guard leave the store?  Scott’s 
guilt or innocence arguably hinged on whether the guard confronted Scott 
in the store (as Scott claimed) or outside (as the guard claimed).  To believe 
the guard’s account, one has to accept that, after he observed Scott take an 
unlocked attaché case from a salesperson, walk around the store with the 
opened bag for up to twenty minutes, and pass by several salespersons, the 
guard concluded that, in a large department store likely to have multiple 
exits, the most appropriate security measure was to . . . turn around and go 
outside. 
Once one begins to doubt the guard’s decision to ignore an obvious 
potential shoplifter, other questions arise:  Was the guard exaggerating the 
amount of time he observed Scott?  Was the guard outside the whole time 
and either did not have as good a view of events as he claimed or simply 
testified to facts that he had been told by another employee?  And if the 
guard was outside the whole time, how did he know that Scott did not pay 
for the case inside? 
Now consider what a defense attorney may have done to develop Scott’s 
case.  She could have spoken with salespersons to see how their accounts 
squared with the guard’s, obtained any security camera footage from the 
store (at least in modern times), verified whether Scott actually had a vision 
problem, and corroborated whether he had additional money on him, say, 
with a recent bank receipt.  Using her familiarity with the Cook County jury 
pool, she then could have determined if a jury of Scott’s peers might be 
persuaded to reject the state’s case.  She also could have advised Scott not 
to take the stand if he was not credible in describing events or if the state’s 
case was too weak to take the risk. 
Had the attorney concluded that Scott was likely to be convicted at trial, 
she could have sought a plea bargain.  Using leverage like the guard’s 
potential vulnerability on the stand, or appealing to the fact that the store 
got its bag back, she could have requested that the prosecution either 
dismiss the case outright or divert the case for later dismissal if Scott stayed 
out of trouble.  Or she could have asked the prosecution to reduce or amend 
the charges to avoid Scott receiving another theft conviction.  This would 
prevent him from receiving an enhanced sentence should something like 
this happen again.  All told, much could have been done, or at least 
attempted, by defense counsel to change the outcome for Scott. 
The U.S. Supreme Court eventually heard Scott’s case in Scott v. 
Illinois.29  The Court had previously held in the landmark decision Gideon 
v. Wainwright30 that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to 
counsel “[i]n all criminal prosecutions” applied to the states in felony 
 
 29. 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
 30. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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cases.31  The Court later held in Argersinger v. Hamlin32 that the right also 
applies against the state in misdemeanor cases where the defendant receives 
a jail sentence.  That left cases such as Scott’s, where the defendant is 
convicted of a misdemeanor but receives only a fine. 
However, while the Court had gradually expanded the right to counsel 
for decades, it abruptly halted that expansion with Scott.  Without any 
mention of the underlying facts of Scott’s case, the Court concluded that 
counsel is only required for a misdemeanor offense when an individual is 
actually incarcerated.33  Scott’s trial was, therefore, fundamentally fair 
because the result was sufficiently minor. 
Mr. Scott’s plight is perhaps best characterized as the anti-Gideon in our 
national saga of the right to counsel.  For many, Gideon promised a 
criminal justice system that would provide all accused with competent 
counsel.34  But this was only one aspect of Gideon’s deeper promise “to 
assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands 
equal before the law.”35  Fifty-four years later, these promises have gone 
unfulfilled, as states have chronically underfunded their public defender 
systems, leaving countless defendants either without counsel or with 
counsel in name only.36  Yet those to whom Gideon grants a right to 
counsel may at least hope the country will eventually live up to its 
obligations under the Sixth Amendment.  Those to whom Scott denies a 
right to counsel have no such hope; their ability to obtain a fair proceeding 
remains unequal.  Thus, while Gideon represents a promise unfulfilled, 
Scott more accurately represents a promise denied, the promise of a truly 
equal justice system for all. 
This Article seeks a new ending to the story of the anti-Gideon.  It argues 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Scott is fundamentally flawed insofar 
as it misunderstands counsel’s role in securing fair treatment of 
misdemeanor defendants in today’s criminal justice system.  The lawyer’s 
role, whether in a case like Scott or Gideon, is much broader than ensuring 
the accuracy or reliability of the proceedings.37  Providing a lawyer to a 
 
 31. Id. at 339, 345. 
 32. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
 33. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–74. 
 34. See, e.g., Michael Piccarreta, President’s Messag, ARIZ. ATT’Y (Mar. 1997), 
http://www.myazbar.org/AZAttorney/Archives/March97/3-97d1.htm [https://perma.cc/ZZA 
4-QSUR]. 
 35. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (“This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man 
charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”). 
 36. See generally Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and 
Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150 (2013). 
 37. In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, (2006), the Court concluded that 
“erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice [constituted] structural error.” Id. at 
150.  In so holding, the Court reflected on the various ways that the assistance of counsel 
may affect a defendant’s case: 
Different attorneys will pursue different strategies with regard to investigation and 
discovery, development of the theory of defense, selection of the jury, presentation 
of the witnesses, and style of witness examination and jury argument.  And the 
choice of attorney will affect whether and on what terms the defendant cooperates 
with the prosecution, plea bargains, or decides instead to go to trial.  In light of 
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defendant unable to afford one also fulfills the commands of fundamental 
fairness and equal justice embodied in the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses.38  But the Court’s focus in right to counsel cases since 
Gideon has veered away from fundamental fairness and toward a more 
individual, rights-oriented approach under the Sixth Amendment that 
privileges the accuracy of criminal adjudications over concerns about 
fairness.39  This focus on the individual’s right to a lawyer and on the 
lawyer’s role with respect to accuracy under the Sixth Amendment 
underemphasizes systemic inequality and breeds differential treatment 
based on wealth.40 
The metastasis of our “assembly line” criminal justice system and the 
increase in penalties like fees and fines—as well as the myriad other ways 
that a prior conviction or arrest may affect later interactions with the 
system—in the years since Scott demonstrates that the actual incarceration 
standard is inherently unfair to indigent defendants.  Yet the Court has 
shown little appetite for revisiting Scott’s interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment. 
Thus, this Article’s primary basis for abandoning the actual incarceration 
standard is not the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Rather, it is the 
guarantee of equal access to the courts secured by the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  This doctrine is 
interwoven throughout the Court’s early right to counsel cases and 
establishes that states may not create dual systems of criminal justice, 
wherein meaningful access to the system is only granted to those who can 
afford it.  The argument we set forth below is therefore not merely an 
alternative to arguments based purely on the Sixth Amendment but instead 
“a return to the roots of the fundamental right of access to justice.”41  
Experiences like those of Scott are almost exclusively those of people who 
cannot afford an attorney.  Only these people risk being forced into court 
 
these myriad aspects of representation, the erroneous denial of counsel bears 
directly on the framework within which the trial proceeds, or indeed on whether it 
proceeds at all.  It is impossible to know what different choices the rejected 
counsel would have made, and then to quantify the impact of those different 
choices on the outcome of the proceedings.  Many counseled decisions, including 
those involving plea bargains and cooperation with the government, do not even 
concern the conduct of the trial at all.  Harmless-error analysis in such a context 
would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate 
universe. 
Id. 
 38. See Tracey L. Meares, What’s Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 215, 215–16 
(2003) (“Throughout the early due process cases comprising the infancy of constitutional 
criminal procedure, the Court demonstrated not only an interest in securing accurate 
determinations of guilt for state criminal defendants, but also an obvious concern about the 
relationship between the structure of criminal courts and the social and political legitimacy 
of American democracy.”). 
 39. Id. at 216–17. 
 40. See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense 
Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1242–43 (2013) (contrasting the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel with the right to meaningful review grounded in the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 41. Id. at 1201. 
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without a lawyer and branded as criminals, with all the consequences that 
stigma brings.  By contrast, the wealthy are entirely insulated from such 
harms, as they are free to retain an attorney regardless of the Court’s 
interpretation of what the Sixth Amendment requires.  By virtue of that 
ability, they experience an entirely different system of justice. 
Part I of this Article reviews the Supreme Court’s decisions establishing 
the right to counsel and the actual incarceration standard.  It also critiques 
the doctrinal and practical shortcomings of the Court’s opinion in Scott and 
explains why the resulting actual incarceration standard is premised on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of today’s criminal justice system.  Next, 
Part II describes responses offered to address such critiques and the 
obstacles to replacing Scott with a new Sixth Amendment standard.  Then, 
Part III provides an overview of the Court’s access to courts jurisprudence, 
grounded in equal protection and due process, and examines why it requires 
abandoning the actual incarceration standard, as well as some of the 
alternative Sixth Amendment proposals that have been offered to replace 
Scott.  This Article concludes by explaining why the right to meaningful 
access requires a right to counsel for most, if not all, criminal defendants 
but can also be satisfied by removing certain petty offenses from the 
criminal code altogether. 
I.  THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MISDEMEANOR CASES 
Part I.A provides an overview of the Court’s right to counsel 
jurisprudence, including the limitations on the right as applied to 
misdemeanor defendants.  Ultimately, only misdemeanor defendants who 
are subject to actual incarceration are entitled to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment.  Part I.B explains why that standard is problematic from both 
a doctrinal and a practical standpoint. 
A.  The Right to Counsel as Currently Defined 
Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel, that right 
did not apply to those facing prosecution in state courts until the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Powell v.  Alabama.42  In Powell, the Court held that in 
the context of state capital cases, due process required the assistance of 
counsel,43 explaining: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.  Even the intelligent and 
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of 
law. . . .  He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him.  Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the 
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his 
innocence.44 
 
 42. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 43. Id. at 71. 
 44. Id. at 68–69. 
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It was not until three decades later that the Court recognized a categorical 
right to counsel beyond the confines of capital litigation.45  In Gideon, 
relying on the notion that appointment of counsel is a “fundamental right, 
essential to a fair trial” and necessary to safeguard liberty,46 the Court 
extended the right to apply to defendants facing felony charges in state 
court.47 
In Argersinger, the Court recognized that the right to counsel also 
applied to some misdemeanor prosecutions.48  The Court did not apply the 
right to all misdemeanors; instead, the right applies only to those 
misdemeanor prosecutions that result in incarceration.49  In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Lewis Powell took issue with the Court’s decision to draw 
the line at incarceration, recognizing that other consequences of conviction, 
such as losing one’s driver’s license, may be just as impactful for the 
individual.50  In doing so, he acknowledged the equal protection 
implications of a rule that turns on incarceration, explaining: 
There may well be an unfair and unequal treatment of individual 
defendants, depending on whether the individual judge has determined in 
advance to leave open the option of imprisonment.  Thus, an accused 
indigent would be entitled in some courts to counsel while in other courts 
in the same jurisdiction an indigent accused of the same offense would 
have no counsel.  Since the services of counsel may be essential to a fair 
trial even in cases in which no jail sentence is imposed, the results of this 
type of pretrial judgment could be arbitrary and discriminatory.51 
Powell suggested that due process and principles of fundamental fairness 
demand a case-by-case evaluation of the complexity of the offense, the 
probable sentence if convicted, and any factors specific to the individual 
case suggesting the need for a lawyer.52 
Despite Powell’s concerns, the Court confirmed in Scott that the right to 
counsel would be dependent on incarceration.  At issue in Scott was 
 
 45. The Court did, however, recognize a right to counsel for noncapital federal 
defendants in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
 46. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340–42 (1963). 
 47. Id. at 345. 
 48. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 39–40 (1972). 
 49. Id. at 37 (“We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no 
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or 
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”). 
 50. Id. at 47–48 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The consequences of a misdemeanor 
conviction, whether they be a brief period served under the sometimes deplorable conditions 
found in local jails or the effect of a criminal record on employability, are frequently of 
sufficient magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label ‘petty.’  Serious consequences 
also may result from convictions not punishable by imprisonment.  Stigma may attach to a 
drunken-driving conviction or a hit-and-run escapade.  Losing one’s driver’s license is more 
serious for some individuals than a brief stay in jail.”). 
 51. Id. at 54.  Justice Powell also pointed out that the Court’s ruling would emphasize 
the line between those able to qualify as indigent and those who are barely self-sufficient 
economically:  while the former would be entitled to counsel for even the simplest of petty 
offenses (when even nonindigents would decline to hire an attorney), the latter would be 
unable to afford counsel, even when essential to providing an effective defense. Id. at 49–50. 
 52. Id. at 47, 64. 
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whether a defendant charged with an offense for which imprisonment was 
authorized but not actually imposed had a right to counsel.53  Affirming the 
state court’s holding below, the Court refused to extend Argersinger to 
require the appointment of counsel in such cases.54  In doing so, the Court 
reasoned that “actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines 
or the mere threat of imprisonment” and that any extension of Argersinger’s 
workable bright-line rule “would create confusion and impose 
unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse 
States.”55 
The rule set forth in Scott—that a criminal defendant in state court is 
entitled to the appointment of counsel only if his conviction results in 
incarceration—remains the law today.  This is true even though the text of 
the Sixth Amendment refers broadly to “all criminal prosecutions”56 and, as 
Justice Powell argued in Argersinger, collateral consequences of conviction 
may be just as, if not more, severe than incarceration.57  Just this past May, 
for example, a federal judge in New York sentenced a woman to probation 
rather than prison after she was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine 
and possession with intent to distribute, finding that the collateral 
consequences she would face as a convicted felon were a severe enough 
form of punishment.58 
In Alabama v. Shelton,59 an Alabama state court’s application of 
Argersinger and Scott in the context of a suspended sentence added another 
layer to the Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence.  After representing 
himself in a bench trial, LeReed Shelton was convicted in an Alabama 
circuit court of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to thirty days in jail.60  
The trial court immediately suspended the sentence, placing Shelton on 
probation.61  The Supreme Court held that the right to counsel did apply to 
a defendant in Shelton’s situation and that a suspended sentence that may 
end in imprisonment also could not be imposed without the assistance of 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment.62  Shelton’s remedy, however, 
 
 53. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979). 
 54. Id. at 373–74. 
 55. Id. at 373. 
 56. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
 57. See Brian M. Murray, Beyond the Right to Counsel:  Increasing Notice of Collateral 
Consequences, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1170 (2015); see also Alexandra Natapoff, 
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1325–26 (2012) (demonstrating that a misdemeanor 
conviction can bar eligibility for many professional licenses, render an individual ineligible 
for public housing, make the offender ineligible for health care programs, require enrollment 
in a sex offender registry, lead to deportation, and affect child custody, food stamp 
eligibility, and the right to vote). 
 58. See United States v. Nesbeth, No. 15-CR-18, 2016 WL 3022073 (E.D.N.Y. May 24, 
2016); see also Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Judge, in Striking Move, Sentences Felon to 
Probation, Not Prison, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2016, at A21. 
 59. 535 U.S. 654 (2002). 
 60. See id. at 655–58. 
 61. Id. at 658. 
 62. Id.  The rationale for this distinction is that “revocation of probation would trigger a 
prison term imposed for a misdemeanor of which Shelton was found guilty without the aid 
of counsel.” Id. at 664. 
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provided only a partial victory.  Though the Court’s decision invalidated 
Shelton’s suspended sentence, it left his conviction intact.63  Shelton 
therefore remained vulnerable to any collateral consequences of his 
conviction. 
B.  How Scott Misconceptualized the Role 
of Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Scott, to limit the right to counsel to 
those defendants who are actually incarcerated, suffers from numerous 
doctrinal and practical flaws.  Doctrinally, Scott represents a dramatic 
overreach by the Court to halt the expansion of the right to counsel.  More 
troubling, the Court’s reasoning also reveals an unwillingness to grapple 
with questions of fundamental fairness in misdemeanor cases.  Thus, this 
section aims to provide context for why the problems facilitated by Scott 
demand not simply a technical readjustment of the right to counsel but 
instead a reframing of why the right to counsel is so fundamental—to all 
defendants—and cannot turn solely on the question of incarceration. 
In Argersinger, the Court held that no defendant could be incarcerated 
unless he had been represented by counsel.64  Subsequently, in Scott, the 
Court’s analysis turned on whether Argersinger’s focus on imprisonment 
represented “a point in a moving line or a holding that States are required to 
go only so far in furnishing counsel to indigent defendants.”65  The Scott 
Court thus framed its central question as whether actual imprisonment was 
a necessary condition for counsel’s appointment or whether the mere 
possibility of incarceration would suffice.  A far more conservative view of 
Argersinger is available, however, based on the specific context in which it 
was decided. 
At issue in Argersinger was the Florida Supreme Court’s holding that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, like the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial, “extends only to trials ‘for non-petty offenses punishable by more than 
six months imprisonment.’”66  The Court ultimately reversed the lower 
court’s decision.67  In doing so, it rejected the Florida court’s equivalence 
of the right to counsel and the right to a jury trial, determining that the 
respective histories of the two rights revealed that the right to counsel was 
broader and more fundamental than the right to a jury.68  Indeed, looking 
back to English common law, the Court emphasized that there has been a 
 
 63. Id. at 659–60. 
 64. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40. 
 65. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979). 
 66. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 27 (quoting State ex rel. Argersigner v. Hamlin, 236 So.2d 
442, 443 (Fla. 1970), rev’d, 407 U.S. 25). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 30 (“While there is historical support for limiting the ‘deep commitment’ to 
trial by jury to ‘serious criminal cases,’ there is no such support for a similar limitation on 
the right to assistance of counsel.”); see also id. at 30–31 (“We reject, therefore, the premise 
that since prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than six months may 
be tried without a jury, they may also be tried without a lawyer.”). 
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longer tradition of guaranteeing the right to counsel for misdemeanor cases 
than for felonies.69 
Given the Court’s tendency to confine its decisions to the facts 
presented,70 if Argersinger represented a limit on how far states had to go in 
providing counsel, that limit was to require actual incarceration for 
counsel’s appointment only in petty offense cases, like Argersinger’s, 
where a defendant has no right to a jury.  This would be consistent with the 
reasoning that, given the more fundamental nature of the right to counsel, 
where a defendant is entitled to a jury trial, he must necessarily have a right 
to an attorney.  But, more importantly, it is unlikely that the Argersinger 
Court viewed itself as establishing an actual incarceration standard at all.  
Although the Argersinger Court declined to declare counsel necessary in all 
petty offense cases, it acknowledged that the penalty states attach to a 
particular charge is an inadequate proxy for the complexities of the defense: 
The requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair trial even in a 
petty-offense prosecution.  We are by no means convinced that legal and 
constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to 
imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when a 
person can be sent off for six months or more.71 
The Court went on to state explicitly that “the problems associated with 
misdemeanor and petty offenses often require the presence of counsel to 
insure the accused a fair trial.”72  Yet the Court never explained why actual 
incarceration is the proper measure of the need for counsel in a petty case.  
This omission most likely resulted from the Court’s belief that “[it] need 
not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards the right 
to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved, however, for here petitioner 
was in fact sentenced to jail.”73  Whatever the answer to the question of its 
propriety, nothing in Argersinger suggests that the Court intended for the 
actual incarceration standard to apply to nonpetty cases, and there is ample 
evidence that the Court did not intend actual incarceration as the final 
standard for all misdemeanors.74 
This narrowed understanding of Argersinger—that, if it applies at all, the 
actual incarceration standard applies only to petty offenses—significantly 
recasts the question in Scott.  Though he ultimately received only a fine, 
Scott faced a year in jail on a theft charge.75  On this latter fact alone, Scott 
 
 69. Id. at 30. 
 70. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (noting that, in Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Court “did by its language, as this Court frequently does, 
limit its holding to the particular facts and circumstances of that case”). 
 71. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 33. 
 72. Id. at 36–37. 
 73. Id. at 37.  Argersinger was sentenced to ninety days in jail; he was charged with 
carrying a concealed weapon, an offense punishable by imprisonment up to six months, a 
$1,000 fine, or both. Id. at 26. 
 74. See, e.g., id. at 52 (Powell. J., concurring) (“Thus, although the new rule is extended 
today only to the imprisonment category of cases, the Court's opinion foreshadows the 
adoption of a broad prophylactic rule applicable to all petty offenses.”). 
 75. And but for the prosecutor’s omission of Scott’s prior theft conviction from the 
charging document, he would have faced felony charges. People v. Scott, 343 N.E.2d 517, 
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should have prevailed on the argument that he had a right to counsel for his 
“nonpetty” theft prosecution.  Seven Justices on the Scott Court at some 
point supported this constitutional line:  Chief Justice Warren Burger and 
Justices Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist in Argersinger, and Justices 
William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, John Paul Stevens, and Harry 
Blackmun in Scott.76  As Justice Powell forcefully declared in his 
Argersinger concurrence, while  
[a]n unskilled layman may be able to defend himself in a nonjury trial 
before a judge experienced in piecing together unassembled 
facts[,] . . . before a jury the guiding hand of counsel is needed to marshal 
the evidence into a coherent whole consistent with the best case on behalf 
of the defendant.77 
In fact, five Justices either expressly or impliedly supported this 
constitutional line in Scott.78 
But Scott lost 5–4.  Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist abandoned 
his stance with Justice Powell in Argersinger.  He instead focused the 
analysis on Scott’s fine-only sentence, declaring:  “[W]e believe that the 
central premise of Argersinger—that actual imprisonment is a penalty 
different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment—is 
eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line 
defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.”79 
However, only a plurality of the Court was convinced of Argersinger’s 
supposed central premise.  The remaining five Justices deeply questioned it.  
Justice Powell, whose concurrence provided the decisive fifth vote, 
maintained that the actual incarceration standard was not constitutionally 
required and expressed “continuing reservations” about Argersinger.80  He 
explained that “the drawing of a line based on whether there is 
 
519 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 369 N.E.2d 881 (1977), aff’d, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).  Had this 
occurred, he undoubtedly would have had a right to counsel. 
 76. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40–42 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“Were I able to 
confine my focus solely to the burden that States will have to bear in providing counsel, I 
would be inclined, at this stage of the development of the constitutional right to counsel, to 
conclude that there is much to commend drawing the line at penalties in excess of six 
months’ confinement.”); id. at 45–46 (Powell, J., concurring in the result, joined by Justice 
Rehnquist) (“It is clear that whenever the right-to-counsel line is to be drawn, it must be 
drawn so that an indigent has a right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there is a due 
process right to a jury trial. . . .  Moreover, the interest protected by the right to have guilt or 
innocence determined by a jury . . . while important, is not as fundamental to the guarantee 
of a fair trial as is the right to counsel.”); see also Scott, 440 U.S. at 380 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens) (endorsing Justice Powell’s concurrence 
in Argersinger); id. at 389 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“For substantially the reasons stated 
by Mr. Justice Brennan . . . I would hold that the right to counsel secured by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments extends at least as far as the right to jury trial secured by those 
Amendments.”). 
 77. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 46 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 78. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring) (adhering to his concurrence in 
Argersinger, and noting that only “four Justices have reaffirmed [Argersinger] today”); id. at 
380 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens); id. at 389 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. at 373 (majority opinion). 
 80. Id. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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imprisonment (even for overnight) can have the practical effect of 
precluding provision of counsel in other types of cases in which conviction 
can have more serious consequences.”81  Nonetheless persuaded to join the 
majority by the need to provide lower courts clear guidance and the dictates 
of stare decisis, Powell expressed hope that the Court would one day revisit 
Argersinger.82 
Scott’s actual incarceration standard cannot be reconciled with several of 
the Court’s decisions addressing the rights of defendants to a fair criminal 
process.  For one, Scott upends the Justices’ apparent conviction in 
Argersinger that the right to counsel should sweep more broadly than the 
right to a jury trial.  That is now only true for petty offenses, insofar as 
Argersinger grants the right to counsel to some misdemeanor defendants 
facing incarceration, none of whom would have a right to a jury trial.  But 
Scott reverses matters for nonpetty offenses, in that it denies the right to 
counsel to misdemeanor defendants not facing incarceration, but who 
would have a right to a jury trial.  The Scott majority made no attempt to 
reconcile this result with the history of the Sixth Amendment or the 
practical relationship between the two rights. 
Scott also creates a curious tension with the right to counsel on appeal.  
Sixteen years before Scott, the Court held in Douglas v. California83 that, if 
a state chooses to grant criminal defendants an appeal as a matter of right 
from their convictions, the state must also provide counsel on 
appeal to those unable to afford it.84  Douglas derives from the Court’s 
access to courts line of decisions under the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, discussed further in Part 
III.85  Those cases forbid states from creating invidious barriers in the 
criminal justice system based on wealth.  The Douglas Court deemed the 
right to counsel necessary to prevent an appeal from becoming a 
“meaningless ritual” for those unable to afford an attorney.86 
The Court has never suggested that the right to counsel on appeal turns 
on whether the defendant was incarcerated for the conviction, and none of 
the states or the federal government condition the right to appeal on 
incarceration.  Scott thus creates the odd possibility that a defendant may be 
denied the right to counsel at trial, yet that defendant would still be entitled 
to appellate counsel to challenge the uncounseled conviction.  This is 
precisely what happened to Aubrey Scott, who successfully petitioned 
Illinois for appointed appellate counsel and a free transcript.87  It is 
unsurprising and perhaps ironic that Scott, unable to mount an effective pro 
se defense in the trial court, could raise only one viable claim on appeal:  
the fact that he was forced to proceed pro se in the trial court.  Scott 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 375. 
 83. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
 84. Id. at 357–58. 
 85. See infra Part III.A. 
 86. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358. 
 87. People v. Scott, 343 N.E.2d 517, 520 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 369 N.E.2d 881 
(1977), aff’d, 440 U.S. 367. 
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subsequently eliminated the one challenge an uncounseled defendant could 
reliably mount against his conviction.  As Justice Burger explained in his 
Argersinger concurrence:  “Appeal from a conviction after an uncounseled 
trial is not likely to be of much help to a defendant since the die is usually 
cast when judgment is entered on an uncounseled trial record.”88  Despite 
this warning, no justice on the Scott Court addressed the fact that its 
decision might render an appeal of an uncounseled conviction the same sort 
of meaningless ritual that Douglas was intended to prevent. 
Although decided in a different context, Scott also seems inconsistent 
with Supreme Court precedent guaranteeing the right to pursue postappeal 
remedies in federal court based on the presumption that convictions carry 
collateral consequences.89  Specifically, the Court has long allowed a 
criminal defendant who has been released on his sentence to maintain a 
federal habeas corpus action challenging his conviction.90  This is allowed 
even though the primary purpose of the Great Writ is to remedy unlawful 
detention.91  Eleven years prior to Scott, the Court in Carafas v. LaVallee92 
rejected a mootness challenge to the federal habeas petition of a released 
New York defendant because 
[i]n consequence of his conviction, he cannot engage in certain 
businesses; he cannot serve as an official of a labor union for a specified 
period of time; he cannot vote in any election held in New York State; he 
cannot serve as a juror.  Because of these “disabilities or burdens [which] 
may flow from” petitioner’s conviction, he has “a substantial stake in the 
judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence 
imposed on him.”93 
Those denied counsel under Scott likely never had the chance to initiate a 
habeas action and could not directly rely on Carafas.  Yet, their interests in 
avoiding a conviction rival those of noncustodial habeas petitioners seeking 
to undo their convictions.  So while not directly relevant, Carafas creates 
additional tension with the Scott plurality’s conclusion that actual 
incarceration is the only definitive factor in defining the right to counsel. 
Beyond these doctrinal failings, Scott has aged poorly in light of changed 
realities.  The extent to which noncarceral penalties have multiplied and 
grown since Scott cannot be overstated.  Much of the recent criminal justice 
reform movement has focused on the growth of the nation’s incarcerated 
population.  Nationally, however, probation is the leading form of 
correctional control, covering 56 percent of people in the criminal justice 
 
 88. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 41 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 89. See infra text accompanying notes 92–93. 
 90. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237–38 (1968) (finding a federal habeas 
claim not moot upon the petitioner’s release, given the collateral consequences of 
conviction). 
 91. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8 (1998) (“In recent decades, we have been 
willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral 
consequences . . . .”). 
 92. 391 U.S. 234 (1968). 
 93. Id. at 237. 
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system.94  The use of fines and fees has expanded dramatically as well95 
and has become particularly pervasive among low-level offenses, including 
misdemeanors.96 
John P. Gross asserts that “[t]he Court’s reasoning in Argersinger and 
Scott needs to be viewed against the backdrop of a criminal justice system 
which, at the time, imposed three distinct penalties:  incarceration, fines, or 
probation.”97  That framework does not adequately account for the extent to 
which the web of collateral consequences stemming from conviction has 
grown.  While a misdemeanor conviction already carried significant 
consequences when the Court decided Argersinger,98 those consequences 
are nothing like what they are today.  Critics calling for the Court to 
abandon the actual incarceration standard frequently cite the exponential 
increase in the number and severity of collateral consequences that states 
and the federal government now attach to misdemeanors.99  These civil 
penalties include immigration consequences like detention and deportation; 
loss of employment; loss of public benefits, including housing; loss of child 
custody; revocation of professional licenses; and ineligibility for student 
financial aid.100  Many of these consequences have a far broader reach and 
impact on individuals’ lives than one or two days behind bars.  States are 
also increasingly attaching various supervision or treatment requirements to 
minor offenses through diversion and specialized courts to increase state 
control over defendants with chronic behavioral issues, such as drug 
 
 94. See Bernadette Rabuy & Peter Wagner, Correctional Control:  Incarceration and 
Supervision by State, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (June 1, 2016), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/ 
reports/50statepie.html [https://perma.cc/HXJ4-AREZ]. 
 95. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL:  PAYMENTS IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR 3 (2015), 
http://nacmconference.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue 
_brief.pdf (“A recent study estimates that tens of millions of individuals in the United States 
have been assessed fines or fees as part of the punishment for a criminal offense.  The use of 
these practices has increased substantially over time; in 1986, 12 percent of those 
incarcerated were also fined, while in 2004 this number had increased to 37 percent.  When 
including fees as well, the total rises to 66 percent of all prison inmates. In 2014, 44 States 
charged offenders for probation and parole supervision, up from 26 in 1990.”) 
[https://perma.cc/TP3F-2B69]. 
 96. Id. (“While the use of fines and fees has grown for all sentencing groups, they 
remain more common in cases of misdemeanors, infractions, and other relatively less serious 
crimes than in cases of felonies.”). 
 97. John P. Gross, What Matters More:  A Day in Jail or a Criminal Conviction?, 22 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 55, 80 (2013) (noting that “our modern criminal justice system 
has a wide range of enmeshed penalties that result from a criminal conviction”). 
 98. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972) (acknowledging Justice 
Powell’s critique that some collateral consequences may be worse than a brief jailing). 
 99. Since the 1990s, the federal government and state legislatures have significantly 
increased the volume of collateral consequences that attach to misdemeanor convictions, 
such as sex offender registration, firearms prohibitions, and deportation. See Paul T. Crane, 
Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775, 790–93 (2016); see also Gross, 
supra note 97, at 55; John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”:  The Evolving Right to 
Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 1, 22 (2013). 
 100. See Gross, supra note 97, at 82–84; King, supra note 99, at 24–34. 
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addiction.101  Consequently, some have deemed the combined effects of the 
penalties that follow a conviction a “civil death.”102 
Most prominent in these attacks on Scott’s continued viability is the 
degree to which Congress has authorized immigration detention and 
deportation for minor offenses.103  These critics root their argument in the 
Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,104 which held that 
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel places an 
obligation on defense counsel to inform defendants of certain immigration 
consequences of a criminal conviction.105  Echoing Justice Powell’s critique 
of actual incarceration as the proper proxy for the need for counsel, the 
Padilla Court recognized that civil immigration consequences are “an 
integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty 
that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified 
crimes.”106  The Court had earlier acknowledged this dynamic in INS v. St. 
Cyr,107 where it observed that “[p]reserving the client’s right to remain in 
the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail 
sentence.”108  Though the Court most likely did not intend that by 
expanding the right to effective assistance in Padilla it was also expanding 
the antecedent right to counsel, the decision nonetheless creates an 
untenable paradox in light of Scott:  while a defendant may have the right to 
an attorney’s advice about immigration consequences, an indigent 
defendant may not be entitled to counsel to provide that advice. 
Another major practical consequence of Scott’s actual incarceration 
standard is that it risks effectively giving the prosecution control over a 
defendant’s right to counsel.  One of the principal critiques of Scott is that it 
requires judges to decide prior to trial, and without a full understanding of 
the evidence, whether jail would be appropriate upon conviction.109  Justice 
 
 101. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 
1086 (2015). 
 102. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death:  Rethinking Punishment in the Era 
of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012); see also Wayne A. Logan, 
Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1112 n.72 (2013). 
 103. See, e.g., Note, “A Prison Is a Prison Is a Prison”:  Mandatory Immigration 
Detention and the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 129 HARV. L. REV. 522, 522 (2015) 
(arguing for a right to counsel for those facing mandatory immigration detention); see also 
Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences:  Toward a Sixth Amendment Right to 
Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 585, 598 
(2011). 
 104. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 105. Id. at 374. 
 106. Id. at 364. 
 107. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 108. Id. at 323 (quoting 3 MATTHEW BENDER, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 60A.01 
(1999)). 
 109. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 369, 383 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Under the 
‘actual imprisonment’ standard, ‘[t]he judge will . . . be forced to decide in advance of 
trial—and without hearing the evidence—whether he will forego entirely his judicial 
discretion to impose some sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility to 
consider the full range of punishments established by the legislature.’” (quoting Argersinger 
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 53 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring))); see also id. at 374 (Powell, J., 
concurring) (noting that in lieu of the unrealistic possibility of providing counsel in all cases, 
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Powell argued in his Argersinger concurrence that this would directly 
undermine the legislature’s sentencing prerogatives, as judges would 
inevitably “divide petty offenses into two categories—those for which 
sentences of imprisonment may be imposed and those in which no such 
sentence will be given regardless of the statutory authorization.”110 
Experience suggests the problem is worse than feared.  The more 
common scenario is that judges, overwhelmed by swelling misdemeanor 
dockets, simply defer to prosecutors’ representations about the propriety of 
jail time, rather than conduct their own independent inquiry.111  In places 
like Miami, prosecutors can wield jail time as a tactical weapon to eliminate 
a defendant’s right to counsel on the eve of trial.112  This happens because 
most judges make no inquiry into whether a defendant may be severely 
prejudiced by removing an attorney who has devoted significant resources 
to defending a client. 
Ironically, the Argersinger Court foreshadowed this development.  In 
helping to popularize the term “assembly-line justice,” now used to describe 
much of what happens in criminal, but especially misdemeanor, courts, the 
Court warned that “the volume of misdemeanor cases, far greater in number 
than felony prosecutions, may create an obsession for speedy dispositions, 
regardless of the fairness of the result.”113  The volume of misdemeanor 
prosecutions has dramatically increased in the decades since 
Argersinger.114  The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers’s 
seminal report on the dysfunctions of misdemeanor courts estimates that the 
number of misdemeanor cases in the United States doubled from 5 million 
in 1972 to 10.5 million in 2006.115  This flood of cases creates toxic judicial 
ecosystems where 70 percent of criminal defendants plead guilty without 
counsel in proceedings that often last under three minutes.116 
 
particularly in jurisdictions with crowded dockets or without many lawyers, judges will be 
forced to forgo the option to impose a sentence of imprisonment after conviction); WAYNE 
R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.2(a), at 712 (6th ed. 2017) (“A major 
objection advanced against an actual imprisonment standard was that it would require the 
magistrate . . . to ‘prejudge’ the case in determining whether appointed counsel was 
necessary.”); King, supra note 99, at 15 (“Like the Queen of Hearts in Alice in Wonderland, 
judges in low-level cases are invited to decide in some respect the sentence before the 
trial.”). 
 110. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 53 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 111. See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter:  Defining Effective Advocacy 
in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 311 (2011). 
 112. See infra notes 252–55 and accompanying text.  Even though Florida is a jurisdiction 
in which counsel is required if imprisonment is possible and not only when it is actually 
imposed, its continued reliance on incarceration makes such a tactic possible. See State v. 
Kelly, 999 So.2d 1029 (2009); see also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.111(b)(1). 
 113. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 34. 
 114. See, e.g., King, supra note 99, at 22. 
 115. ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR 
CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE:  THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR 
COURTS 11 (2009), http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/misdemeanor/$FILE/ 
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HB6U-F7BC]. 
 116. ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THREE-
MINUTE JUSTICE:  HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 15 (2011), https:// 
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Due process becomes an afterthought under such conditions.117  First 
sacrificed in today’s misdemeanor assembly lines is our criminal justice 
system’s commitment to the adversarial system.118  Prosecutors, 
undisputedly the most powerful courtroom actor under normal conditions, 
acquire new sources of authority in overburdened misdemeanor courts.  
Merely by removing the possibility of jail, a prosecutor can literally render 
a misdemeanor arrestee defenseless.  And forgoing the possibility of jail has 
become an increasingly minor sacrifice for prosecutors, a reality driven by 
two key developments in the criminal system:  (1) the rise in the number 
and severity of collateral consequences for misdemeanors and (2) the 
criminal system’s overwhelming reliance on plea bargaining. 
Paul T. Crane explains that “prosecutors will often be attuned to certain 
collateral consequences that further the goals of criminal prosecution, 
especially those aimed at reducing threats to public safety.  When it comes 
to low-level offenses, those collateral consequences are often the most 
important goal of a criminal prosecution.”119  More broadly, as Issa Kohler-
Hausmann has noted, the misdemeanor justice system has shifted away 
from adjudicating guilt to a system increasingly used to “mark, classify, and 
supervise people” even without securing an immediate conviction or jail 
sentence.120  The result is that prosecutors now enjoy increased power to 
secure many types of dispositions beyond jail that mark defendants for later 
encounters with the justice system.121  If a defendant is convicted, for 
example, after failing to satisfy the requirements of a diversion program, the 
consequences of such marking become dire, because a misdemeanor 
conviction, even one that is uncounseled, may be used to increase the 
penalty for a subsequent offense.122  This possibility may incentivize a 
prosecutor to offer no jail time on something like an individual’s first 
driving while under the influence (DUI) charge, knowing that she will be 
able to pursue stiffer penalties the next go around. 
Also, collateral consequences—which often apply for years and 




 117. See BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 115, at 7. 
 118. While some courts may participate in “assembly line justice,” in which cases are 
handled quickly and indiscriminately, other misdemeanor courts engage in what Issa Kohler-
Hausmann has termed “managerial justice,” which is “rapid and informal, but . . . not 
random or mechanical.” See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass 
Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 622–24 (2014) (explaining that the managerial model 
of processing mass misdemeanors, unlike the adjudicative model, is not triggered by a 
finding of guilt but is instead concerned with managing the engagement of individuals with 
the criminal justice system—in terms of both degree and extent—over time). 
 119. Crane, supra note 99, at 795. 
 120. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 118, at 643. 
 121. See id. at 645–48. 
 122. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748 (1994); see also Kohler-Hausmann, 
supra note 118, at 644 (“Marks are used inside the system to signify what level of response 
is warranted and what other sorts of testing or punishments will be imposed in the context of 
later encounters.”). 
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incarceration for misdemeanors.123  Returning to the first-time DUI 
example, a prosecutor may prioritize suspending the defendant’s license for 
a year over seeking jail time, especially if she knows the judge is unlikely to 
impose jail on a first-time offender.  Finally, where the collateral 
consequence takes the form of a prohibition or obligation—such as 
abstaining from carrying a gun or registering as a sex offender—violating 
the collateral consequence often results in a separate, and more easily 
proven, offense that may result in jail time.124 
With collateral consequences creating such severe civil disabilities for 
misdemeanants compared to jail time, prosecutors are free to prioritize 
efficiency in their decisions about whether to seek incarceration.125  As with 
most assembly lines, efficiency nearly always trumps quality.  The United 
States’s broken system for providing counsel to those unable to afford it, 
particularly the unconscionable caseloads that budget restraints force public 
defenders to triage, has been extensively documented.126  But these 
caseloads also affect—and are ultimately driven by—district attorney 
offices.  These offices must manage the explosion of arrests for petty crimes 
in the “broken windows” era of policing, which targets ever more minor 
offenses in the hopes of curtailing serious crime.127  In this context, doing 
away with jail time and avoiding opposition may relieve significant 
pressure on prosecutor offices to reduce their caseloads while bolstering 
conviction rates.128  However, allowing prosecutors to leverage a 
defendant’s right to counsel to manage their own caseloads perversely 
places innocent defendants at grave risk of wrongful conviction.  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court recognized in Alabama v. Shelton129 that, having 
shattered “the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing,” uncounseled 
convictions are inherently less reliable.130 
This dynamic tips even more decisively in favor of the prosecution given, 
as the Supreme Court recognized five years ago in Missouri v. Frye131 and 
Lafler v. Cooper,132 that our criminal justice system “is for the most part a 
system of pleas, not a system of trials”;133 thus, “the negotiation of a plea 
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bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical 
point for a defendant.”134  The Court estimated that guilty pleas account for 
97 percent of federal and 94 percent of state convictions.135  Yet the 
defendants in both Argersinger and Scott were convicted after trials before 
a judge, and the Court clearly framed the actual incarceration standard as 
addressing the rights of a defendant at trial, stating:  “Under the rule we 
announce today, every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor 
starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits 
it, unless the accused is represented by counsel.”136 
In all likelihood, the trial in most misdemeanor cases today will never 
start, making the Court’s logic decidedly archaic.  Instead of a court at least 
retaining the potential to protect an uncounseled defendant from the worst 
damage he might inflict on himself at trial, prosecutors are free to plea 
bargain with the uncounseled without intervention.137  Left alone to 
negotiate with the prosecutor, the defendant has no way of knowing that the 
prosecutor’s seemingly generous offer of no jail time may prove ruinous.  
Facing the prospect of pretrial detention, losing their jobs, or heavier 
penalties after trial, innocent defendants may perceive they have no choice 
except to take the plea.138  As with trials conducted without “the guiding 
hand of counsel,” the plea-bargaining process becomes an additional source 
of wrongful outcomes.139 
Even if a defendant would have been willing to plead guilty with counsel, 
the power imbalance created by Scott is troubling.  As with Scott’s 
hypothetical public defender, competent defense counsel could negotiate 
more effectively with the prosecutor, including reaching a plea to an 
alternative offense that might minimize or eliminate potential collateral 
consequences.140  If the most damaging collateral consequences cannot be 
avoided, counsel could also help the defendant evaluate whether the harm 
of the collateral consequence, like deportation or the loss of public housing, 
may be so severe that the defendant is better off simply taking his chances 
at trial.  For nonpetty offenses, counsel can help the defendant decide 
whether to invoke the right to a jury trial.  Thus, a defendant denied the 
“guiding hand” of counsel at trial also suffers at other critical phases of his 
 
 134. Frye, 566 U.S. at 144. 
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 138. See Clapman, supra note 103, at 598. 
 139. Id. 
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cases to work out a plea that avoids deportation and the law affords more opportunities for 
the parties to do so”). 
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defense, including plea negotiations, that could protect him from crippling 
collateral consequences.141 
Scott also creates an imbalance between the uncounseled defendant and 
the courts, in that the decision undervalues the direct consequences of a 
criminal conviction.  The Supreme Court justified the actual incarceration 
standard in part on the premise that actual imprisonment was categorically 
different from a mere fine.142  Though many commentators have argued 
that the impact of collateral consequences warrants rethinking Scott, few 
have examined how the extensive array of fines, fees, and costs that courts 
may now impose upon conviction should affect that decision’s validity. 
Alexandra Natapoff has observed that, “[a]s government budgets shrink 
around the country, lower criminal courts are being reconceptualized and 
repurposed as revenue sources.”143  States and localities are increasingly 
imposing “user fees” on criminal defendants to generate this needed 
revenue.  For instance, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently ruled that 
prosecutors could petition the court to impose a prosecution fee on a 
convicted defendant.144  Perhaps the most extreme example of this 
phenomenon in recent memory comes from the city of Ferguson, Missouri.  
Thrust into the national spotlight by the police shooting of unarmed black 
teenager Michael Brown, the subsequent investigation by the Department of 
Justice into the city’s municipal court system revealed that local judges 
collected $2.46 million in fines and fees in 2013, or over 20 percent of the 
town’s revenue.145  Around the country, a defendant convicted of a minor 
offense may find himself charged for the costs of the police investigation, 
probation supervision, jail stays, and court overhead.146 
The amount of debt generated by a “legal financial obligation” (LFO) can 
quickly overwhelm an indigent defendant.  Failure to pay these LFOs 
exacerbates the debt spiral by leading to additional fees and interest 
charges,147 as well as ruining a debtor’s credit148 or leading to the 
revocation of a driver’s license.149  And to collect this revenue, courts are 
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growing increasingly aggressive,150 resorting to jailing debtors without 
regard to clear Supreme Court precedent limiting these practices.151  The 
result is that a supposedly minor “fine only” offense like Scott’s may still 
ultimately result in incarceration for the unwitting defendant.152 
Of course, LFOs may also ensnare a represented defendant.  But the 
inevitable result of denying counsel to defendants who do not face jail time 
is to make it easier for jurisdictions to secure convictions.153  Indeed, the 
Argersinger Court pointedly observed that, by one estimate, represented 
defendants in certain courts were five times more likely to have their 
charges dismissed than the unrepresented.154  Scott thus perversely allows 
jurisdictions to maintain inflated conviction rates for minor offenses while 
saving on the overhead costs of jail and defense counsel.  They are then free 
to focus on extracting money from defendants processed through this 
system, often using the threat of jail.  Understanding the pitfalls—whether 
labeled direct or collateral—that unrepresented defendants face once the 
state tags them as criminals reveals the central irony in Scott:  despite the 
Argersinger Court’s overriding concern with counsel’s role in preventing 
assembly line justice, Scott allows states to operate their assembly lines at a 
more brutal pace than ever. 
II.  POTENTIAL FIXES—AND THEIR FLAWS 
Various authors have urged rejection of the actual incarceration standard 
for appointing counsel under the Sixth Amendment.155  Like the Justices 
who declined to join the main opinions in Argersinger and Scott, these 
critics have emphasized that the standard bears no connection to the 
seriousness of the offense, the complexity of the legal issues involved, or 
the severity of the collateral consequences that may stem from such a 
conviction.156 
The most common proposal for a new Sixth Amendment standard is to 
provide counsel for any individual facing a conviction.157  The position 
relies primarily on the severity of collateral consequences for 
misdemeanors.  Second most common among the Scott fixes is to guarantee 
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the right to counsel for those facing deportation, arguably the most severe 
collateral consequence.158 
All of these critiques rely, at least implicitly, on the premise that it is 
fundamentally unfair for an uncounseled conviction to authorize a 
debilitating collateral consequence.  Under this view, not only are 
uncounseled convictions less reliable by their very nature, but providing 
counsel to the indigent defendant facing misdemeanor convictions is also 
necessary to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system.159 
The major impediment for these proponents is that the Supreme Court 
has largely abandoned the principles of fundamental fairness animating 
Gideon.  Post-Gideon, the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has 
focused heavily on the reliability of convictions, arguably to the exclusion 
of other goals, and on the role of counsel in ensuring such reliability.160  In 
that vein, the Court has narrowed the right to counsel inquiry for 
misdemeanors to the question of whether uncounseled convictions are 
adequately reliable for certain criminal justice outcomes.  In the process, it 
has endorsed the view that, because uncounseled convictions are not 
inherently unreliable—even if they are categorically less reliable than 
counseled convictions—they may support incarceration in subsequent 
criminal proceedings. 
To explain, in Nichols v. United States,161 the Court held that 
uncounseled convictions obtained in accordance with Scott can be used to 
enhance the sentence for a subsequent conviction.162  In an opinion by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist—the author of Scott—the Court framed Nichols as 
overturning its prior decision in Baldasar v. Illinois.163  There, the Court 
issued a per curiam opinion holding that an uncounseled misdemeanor 
conviction, even if valid under Scott, could not be used to elevate the level 
of, and minimum sentence for, a subsequent offense.164  But the Baldasar 
majority could not settle on a rationale for the opinion, with two separate 
concurrences joined by five Justices.  Justice Powell dissented with three 
other Justices and argued that a valid conviction could be used to enhance a 
subsequent sentence.165 
Nichols involved a defendant whose uncounseled prior conviction 
contributed three criminal history points to raise his offense level one 
category under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for a drug charge.166  
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Subsequently, the judge sentenced Nichols to a maximum term of 235 
months, 25 more months than the prescribed maximum term had the prior 
conviction been excluded.167  The Court, invoking Justice Powell’s dissent 
in Baldasar, determined that, although Nichols’s uncounseled conviction 
resulted in a higher sentence for the subsequent offense, Nichols was only 
punished for the subsequent offense.168  Relying on the “less exacting” 
nature of the sentencing process, the Court additionally noted that the 
sentencing court could have considered Nichols’s alleged criminal conduct 
as a sentencing factor even if there had been no conviction.169  Because the 
state only had to prove such conduct by a preponderance of the evidence, “it 
must be constitutionally permissible to consider a prior uncounseled 
misdemeanor conviction based on the same conduct where that conduct 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”170  The Court went on to reject 
the notion that the defendant should at least be warned that an uncounseled 
conviction might enhance a later sentence because the local courts 
responsible for most uncounseled convictions do not keep records of the 
proceedings to memorialize the warning.171 
Concurring with the judgment, Justice David Souter revealed the 
majority’s sleight of hand in “overruling” Baldasar.172  Deeming that 
decision too splintered to overrule, Justice Souter instead began with 
Argersinger’s sustaining premise “that the concern over reliability raised by 
the absence of counsel is tolerable when a defendant does not face the 
deprivation of his liberty.”173  For Justice Souter, Argersinger raised serious 
doubts about whether a defendant could permissibly receive an enhanced 
sentence based solely on an uncounseled and unreliable prior conviction.174  
But, as Justice Souter noted, Nichols did not raise that issue.  Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Nichols’s sentencing judge could have 
departed from the recommended sentencing range if she had concerns about 
the reliability of Nichols’s prior conviction.175  Justice Souter concluded 
that “[w]here concern for reliability is accommodated, as it is under the 
Guidelines, nothing in the Sixth Amendment or our cases requires a 
sentencing court to ignore the fact of a valid uncounseled conviction, even 
if that conviction is a less confident indicator of guilt than a counseled one 
would be.”176  By contrast, where an uncounseled conviction automatically 
enhances the statutory penalty for a subsequent charge—and thus must be 
considered a substantive element of that new offense under the Sixth 
Amendment rather than a mere sentencing factor177—a sentencing judge is 
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powerless to mitigate the sentencing range based on concerns about the 
reliability of the prior uncounseled conviction. 
Despite Justice Souter’s protestations, the Court has not abandoned 
Nichols.  Nor has it abandoned its myopic insistence on reliability as the 
touchstone of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in misdemeanor cases.  
This past Term, a unanimous Court in United States v. Bryant178 reaffirmed 
that valid convictions under Scott can serve as the basis for any sentencing 
enhancement.179  Bryant adds a twist to Nichols because the defendant in 
Bryant received jail time on the uncounseled convictions that automatically 
enhanced, and, indeed, provided the entire basis for, his subsequent federal 
conviction.  Specifically, Bryant was convicted in federal court of 
“domestic assault in Indian country by a habitual offender” under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 117(a).180  The statute imposes a maximum five-year sentence on anyone 
with at least two prior domestic violence convictions in state, federal, or 
Indian tribal courts.  Bryant’s predicate convictions were all in tribal court, 
and they were all uncounseled.181  For most of those uncounseled 
convictions, Bryant served jail terms of less than a year.182  Had Bryant’s 
prior convictions been in federal court, they would have violated the Sixth 
Amendment and could not have supported conviction under a recidivist 
statute.183  “But,” the Court pointedly noted, “the Sixth Amendment does 
not apply to tribal-court proceedings,” and, under the Indian Civil Rights 
Act of 1968, only those sentenced to more than a year’s imprisonment are 
entitled to counsel.184 
Bryant nonetheless argued that his uncounseled convictions, though 
technically not in violation of the Sixth Amendment, still implicated the 
reliability concerns supporting the right to counsel in criminal cases.185  The 
Court was unpersuaded.  Seemingly conceding that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel hinges on concerns about reliability, the Court asserted that 
Scott and Nichols still preclude any notion that uncounseled convictions are 
“categorically unreliable.”186  The Court bolstered this position by pointing 
out that Bryant had admitted he would have no claim for relief had he 
received only fines in the prior proceedings because those convictions 
would certainly be valid under Scott in any U.S. court.187  The Court went 
on to emphasize that the reliability of tribal proceedings do not turn on “the 
sanction—fine only or a year in prison—ultimately imposed.”188 
Of course the reliability of the proceedings cannot be gauged solely by 
the result of those proceedings.  But herein lies the means by which the 
 
 178. 135 S. Ct. 1954 (2016). 
 179. Id. at 1966. 
 180. Id. at 1956. 
 181. See id. at 1957. 
 182. See id. at 1962. 
 183. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 111 (1967). 
 184. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1958. 
 185. See id. at 1966. 
 186. Id. (emphasis added). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
2324 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
Court has both enlarged and distorted the role of reliability under the Sixth 
Amendment.  While the Court has acknowledged counsel’s role in ensuring 
reliability and that reliability cannot be assessed based on the sanction 
imposed, the sanction imposed remains the metric by which counsel is 
deemed necessary.  Indeed, the Argersinger Court recognized the 
incoherence of such logic when it determined that counsel may be 
necessary in some petty offense cases because it doubted that the “legal and 
constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to 
imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when a 
person can be sent off for six months or more.”189  It is easy enough to say 
that the potential consequences of a proceeding indicate little about the 
proceeding itself.  What is left unclear is how one can make a principled 
decision that the proceeding is reliable enough to impose collateral 
consequences but not time in prison.  Nonetheless, this is the distinction not 
only endorsed in Nichols and Bryant but that arguably has its roots in 
Argersinger and Scott.  Although reliability is not explicitly discussed in 
Scott, and the Court’s stated rationale is sparse, notions of reliability likely 
explain the Court’s willingness to allow uncounseled convictions so long as 
they do not result in “so severe a sanction” as incarceration.190 
The Nichols and Bryant Courts’ endorsement of the idea that 
uncounseled convictions are sufficiently reliable for use in subsequent 
criminal proceedings creates a conundrum for those advancing a new Sixth 
Amendment standard based on the collateral consequences of criminal 
convictions.  Bryant deems an uncounseled misdemeanor valid enough to 
serve as an element of a subsequent offense that results in incarceration.  
Moreover, the Court has held the line for nearly four decades on the notion 
that incarceration is a penalty different in kind from any other.  Without a 
fundamental reexamination of these positions, or of the foundational values 
underpinning the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it is difficult to 
imagine the Court holding that the same conviction, which might later serve 
as a predicate to actual incarceration, could not provide the basis for a 
collateral consequence. 
Even if such a reexamination occurred and the Court expanded the right 
to counsel, concerns regarding its implementation would remain.  Many 
indigent defendants already do not receive counsel even when they are 
legally entitled to it under current Sixth Amendment doctrine.191  A 2004 
report by the American Bar Association revealed that many indigent 
defendants are never provided counsel and that the problem is exacerbated 
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in misdemeanor cases.192  A report by the National Right to Counsel 
Committee in 2009 stated that in “misdemeanor courts across the 
country . . . counsel is oftentimes either not provided, or provided late, to 
those who are lawfully eligible to be represented.”193  Whether caused by 
limited resources, apathy toward the accused, or ignorance of constitutional 
requirements, the failure of misdemeanor courts to meet current indigent 
defense needs suggests that expanding the right will confront myriad 
difficulties.  However, rather than approach the problem as a zero-sum 
game,194 where meaningful expansion of the right to counsel is contingent 
upon jurisdictions increasing their fiscal or ideological commitments, we 
suggest in Part III that reducing the number of criminal cases requiring 
counsel may avoid more difficult questions about how to provide more 
public defenders for misdemeanor defendants. 
In considering the feasibility of an expanded right to counsel, it is worth 
noting that most states have rejected Scott and extended the right to court-
appointed counsel beyond Scott’s requirements.  As of 2013, five states 
(California,195 Delaware,196 Indiana,197 New York,198 and Oklahoma199) 
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recognized the right to counsel in all misdemeanor cases, four states 
(Alaska,200 Minnesota,201 North Carolina,202 and Vermont203) recognized 
the right to counsel if the potential fine is sufficiently high, twenty-seven 
states and the District of Columbia recognized the right to counsel in 
misdemeanor cases if incarceration is possible,204 three states (Missouri,205 
North Carolina,206 and Pennsylvania207) recognized the right to counsel in 
misdemeanor cases if incarceration is probable, and two states (Nevada208 
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and South Dakota209) recognized a right to counsel in misdemeanor cases 
where incarceration for more than six months is possible (i.e., where a 
defendant also has a federal right to a jury). 
While these exceptions demonstrate that extending the right to counsel 
beyond Scott is not per se impractical, they also suggest that it will be 
difficult to identify a uniform replacement for the actual incarceration 
standard that is fully satisfying.  For example, North Carolina law provides 
for the appointment of counsel when imprisonment or a fine of $500 or 
more is “likely to be adjudged.”210  In Vermont, indigent criminal 
defendants are entitled to a court-appointed lawyer for offenses with a 
sentence of imprisonment upon conviction or carrying a fine in excess of 
$1,000.211  And Alaska has interpreted its own state constitution to provide 
for a right to the assistance of counsel for offenses that may result in 
incarceration or “the loss of a valuable license, or which may result in a 
heavy enough fine to indicate criminality.”212  These state laws are arguably 
an improvement upon the Argersinger-Scott rule from the standpoint of 
defendants who benefit.  Yet they still exclude many defendants also 
greatly in need of counsel who may be denied a lawyer based on their 
financial status.  Further, they remain based on the potential punishments 
attached to a criminal conviction, which Argersinger and Bryant confirm 
bears little relationship to the complexity of the underlying case.  Though 
some amount of arbitrariness is a natural consequence of line drawing, the 
issue is whether that line drawing comports with the ideals of fundamental 
fairness and equal access championed in Gideon, especially where the 
conviction itself, rather than the fine or potential sentence authorized by the 
conviction, is often the most damaging outcome of a criminal prosecution. 
III.  EQUAL PROTECTION:  AN ALTERNATIVE PATH 
In this part, we contend that viewing the right to counsel in misdemeanor 
cases not from a Sixth Amendment perspective but instead from the vantage 
point of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses and the right of meaningful access to the courts provides a superior 
 
assigned.”); id. § 193.140 (“Every person convicted of a gross misdemeanor shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 364 days, or by a fine of not 
more than $2,000, or by both fine and imprisonment.”). 
 209. In re Wright, 189 N.W.2d 447, 449–50 (S.D. 1971) (“The petty-offense rule now has 
Congressional approval.  18 U.S.C.A. 3006A.  That provision denies to defendants in federal 
prosecutions the right to appointed counsel if their offense is petty, which is defined therein 
as any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment of six months or a 
fine of not more than $500 or both.  Until the United States Supreme Court decides the issue 
presented otherwise, we hold that the applicant was not entitled to court-appointed counsel 
by virtue of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. That provision, in 
our view, does not extend the right to offenses of this type. . . .  The provision of the South 
Dakota Constitution on which [defendant] relies is Art. VI, § 7.  It is substantially like the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”). 
 210. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451(a)(1). 
 211. State v. Duval, 589 A.2d 321, 323 (Vt. 1991). 
 212. Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910, 915 (Alaska 1971) (interpreting 
article I, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution). 
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framework to resolve the dilemmas described above.  While the Supreme 
Court has made clear the limitations of the Sixth Amendment as applied to 
misdemeanor defendants, those defendants are still entitled to meaningful 
access to the courts by cases like Gideon and Griffin v. Illinois,213 described 
in Part III.A below.  That right suggests that the denial of counsel to 
misdemeanor defendants—particularly those facing a host of severe 
collateral consequences—may not raise any Sixth Amendment issues yet 
may still run counter to the right of meaningful access. 
The primary difference between these two areas of constitutional law lies 
in the type of line drawing that is permissible under each approach.  Unless 
the Sixth Amendment requires counsel for all criminal defendants, some 
line drawing between those entitled to counsel and those who are not is 
inevitable.  Erica Hashimoto asserts that the actual incarceration line drawn 
in Argersinger, Scott, and Shelton is defensible because it provides states 
with “distinct options for complying with the constitutional requirement” 
and permits jurisdictions to focus on providing, rather than denying, 
representation.214  While many have critiqued the standard’s reliance on 
incarceration, she emphasizes that, by doing so, it offers states “a low-cost 
way to comply with the Constitution:  eliminate incarceration and probated 
sentences for low-level offenders.”215  But, even framed as an economic 
matter, we must still ask:  What costs does the Constitution require states to 
pay and, consequently, which defendants does it allow states to leave 
behind?216 
Hashimoto presents the two possible routes for avoiding a Sixth 
Amendment violation under the Argersinger-Scott-Shelton line of cases as 
equal:  a risk-averse legislature can either appoint counsel in all 
misdemeanor cases where there is a possibility of incarceration or it can 
remove the possibility of incarceration altogether (meaning that the 
defendants in such cases are not entitled to counsel).  Both solutions are 
equally effective in avoiding a Sixth Amendment violation.  However, 
neither adequately accounts for the range of consequences that result from 
conviction, or even the charge, because those factors are irrelevant to the 
Sixth Amendment analysis.  As explained below, from the perspective of 
ensuring meaningful access to the courts, both solutions are deeply flawed. 
Moreover, in those jurisdictions that have chosen neither one of those 
two extremes, but instead leave discretion to the judge or the prosecutor to 
determine whether a defendant’s sentence will involve incarceration, the 
equal protection problems are even more troubling.  In such a jurisdiction, 
two defendants may be deemed indigent and charged with the same offense, 
 
 213. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
 214. Erica Hashimoto, The Problem with Misdemeanor Representation, 70 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1019, 1041 (2013). 
 215. Id. at 1042. 
 216. Cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 62 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (“If I 
were satisfied that the guarantee of due process required the assistance of counsel in every 
case in which a jail sentence is imposed or that the only workable method of insuring justice 
is to adopt the majority’s rule, I would not hesitate to join the Court’s opinion despite my 
misgivings as to its effect upon the administration of justice.”). 
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yet only one will be denied counsel because of a discretionary decision in 
that defendant’s case.  Still another defendant, who has not been deemed 
indigent and thus can afford to retain counsel regardless of the 
determination made with regard to incarceration, is almost never subject to 
revocation of his Sixth Amendment right. 
The Court’s focus on reliability under its Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence and its adherence to the view that uncounseled convictions 
are reliable enough to support certain direct and collateral criminal penalties 
allow constitutional compliance to turn on the cost the state is willing to 
bear to seek certain ends.  While Scott held that uncounseled convictions 
cannot result in incarceration, those convictions can be used to impose fines 
and other collateral consequences.217  As a result, states are free to pursue 
convictions in all cases and can accommodate the level of representation 
they are able or willing to provide simply by deciding not to seek jail time 
in certain cases. 
Framed instead as a question of equal access to the courts under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the relevant inquiry shifts from “what costs we are 
willing to impose to secure certain convictions” to “whether those accused 
of crimes have access to a meaningful defense.”  With a focus on process 
first and outcomes second, states could no longer rely on actual 
incarceration as a valve to relieve pressure on their indigent defense 
systems.  Imposing this higher constitutional floor would require states to 
provide effective counsel to all defendants instead of drawing a line 
between groups of defendants.  The resulting costs would likely require that 
states take some cases out of the criminal system altogether to ensure that 
those cases that remain do not run afoul of equal protection.  In other 
words, even if we maintain a pragmatic understanding of limited resources, 
we need not lessen the state’s obligation to provide effective counsel to all 
defendants if we can reduce the number of cases in which that obligation 
applies. 
Therefore, rather than focus on the likelihood or feasibility of a Sixth 
Amendment-driven remedy, we recommend that—in the spirit of Justice 
Brennan’s and Justice Powell’s opinions in Argersinger and Scott218—those 
seeking reform look instead to equal protection and the right of meaningful 
access to the courts. 
A.  Equal Protection and Access to the Courts 
While not recently deployed by the Court in its right to counsel cases,219 
there is a robust body of jurisprudence historically linking access to the 
 
 217. See supra Part I.B. 
 218. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 63 n.31 (Powell, J., concurring) (“It seems to me that 
such an individualized rule, unlike a six-month rule and the majority’s rule, does not present 
equal protection problems under this Court’s decisions in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 
(1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); and Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 
189 (1971).”). 
 219. See Lucas, supra note 40, at 1220 (noting that the Court’s recent right to effective 
counsel jurisprudence has relied exclusively on the Sixth Amendment). 
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courts and equal protection.  The Court first expressed concern about 
indigent defendants’ ability to access the courts in Powell v. Alabama.220  
Holding that the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel in capital 
cases, the Powell Court relied primarily on the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.221  While it did not rely explicitly on the Equal 
Protection Clause, the opinion did emphasize “the inequitable treatment of 
indigents in criminal proceedings” and a “general concern about indigents’ 
ability to participate in the judicial process.”222  Animating the Powell 
Court (and, subsequently, the Gideon Court) was the understanding that a 
layperson, without legal training, would be unable to effectively navigate 
the judicial system: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.  Even the intelligent and 
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.  
If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for 
himself whether the indictment is good or bad.  He is unfamiliar with the 
rules of evidence.  Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial 
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or 
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.  He lacks both 
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he 
have a perfect one.  He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step 
in the proceedings against him.  Without it, though he be not guilty, he 
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish 
his innocence.223 
Gideon is well known as the case establishing that indigent defendants 
have a right to court-appointed counsel in state criminal cases.224  Primarily 
recognized as a Sixth Amendment case, Gideon also relied on equal 
protection principles, noting safeguards must be in place to ensure that 
“every defendant stands equal before the law.”225  As originally understood, 
the Sixth Amendment protected only the right to retain or employ volunteer 
counsel.226  The transition from that negative interpretation to a more 
affirmative understanding of the right, made complete by Gideon, was 
necessarily driven by the desire to equalize access. 
Less than a decade before Gideon, the Court relied more explicitly on 
equal protection in Griffin, holding that because of its importance to 
meaningful appellate review, a trial transcript could not be withheld from a 
criminal defendant based on his inability to pay the cost of such a 
transcript.227  Similarly, in Douglas v. California,228 decided the same day 
 
 220. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 221. Id. at 71–72. 
 222. Lucas, supra note 40, at 1221. 
 223. Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69.  This is also quoted in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 344–45 (1963). 
 224. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891). 
 227. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13–14, 16, 19 (1956) (“Destitute defendants must be 
afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy 
transcripts.”). 
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as Gideon, the Court held that the government must provide indigent 
defendants with counsel on appeal.229  Treading outside of the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantees, the Douglas Court relied on equal protection 
principles, stating: 
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment 
where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of 
counsel’s examination into the record, research of the law, and marshaling 
of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, where the record is unclear 
or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while 
the rich man has a meaningful appeal.230 
Griffin, Gideon, Douglas, and the cases that followed might therefore be 
viewed as establishing two key principles in access to courts jurisprudence:  
(1) a defendant’s relative (or lack of) wealth should not determine his or her 
treatment by the court and (2) indigent defendants are entitled to as 
meaningful a review as defendants of financial means.231  In subsequent 
cases, like Entsminger v. Iowa,232 Mayer v. Chicago,233 and Britt v. North 
Carolina,234 the Court continued to emphasize this point, holding that “the 
Fourteenth Amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor criminals in 
equal scale”235 and that indigent prisoners must be provided “with the basic 
tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a 
price to other prisoners.”236  As one commentator has noted, the primary 
rationale for the Court’s decision in Mayer, holding that indigent defendants 
cannot be required to pay costs to appeal a misdemeanor conviction (even 
when the defendant has not been sentenced to a term of incarceration), was 
that “imposing costs upon indigents as a condition of appeal constitutes 
invidious discrimination, regardless of the interest at stake’s gravity.”237 
In Mayer, the state attempted to distinguish the case at hand from those 
in which the defendant was imprisoned, an argument the Court soundly 
rejected: 
Where the accused, as here, is not subject to imprisonment, but only a 
fine, the city suggests that his interest in a transcript is outweighed by the 
State’s fiscal and other interests in not burdening the appellate process.  
This argument misconceives the principle of Griffin no less than does the 
 
 228. 372 U.S. 353 (1983). 
 229. Id. at 357–58. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See Lucas, supra note 40, at 1224. 
 232. 386 U.S. 748 (1967). 
 233. 404 U.S. 189 (1971). 
 234. 404 U.S. 226 (1971). 
 235. Entsminger, 386 U.S. at 752. 
 236. Britt, 404 U.S. at 227. 
 237. Lloyd C. Anderson, The Constitutional Right of Poor People to Appeal Without 
Payment of Fees:  Convergence of Due Process and Equal Protection in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 32 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 441, 450 (1999); see also Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196 (“The size of the 
defendant’s pocketbook bears no more relationship to his guilt or innocence in a nonfelony 
than in a felony case.  The distinction drawn by Rule 607(b) is, therefore, an ‘unreasoned 
distinction’ proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 
305, 310 (1966))). 
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line that Rule 607(b) expressly draws.  Griffin does not represent a 
balance between the needs of the accused and the interests of society; its 
principle is a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out of as 
effective an appeal as would be available to others able to pay their own 
way.  The invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal 
procedures are made available only to those who can pay is not erased by 
any differences in the sentences that may be imposed.  The State’s fiscal 
interest is, therefore, irrelevant.238 
The Mayer Court went on to observe: 
The practical effects of conviction of even petty offenses of the kind 
involved here are not to be minimized.  A fine may bear as heavily on an 
indigent accused as forced confinement.  The collateral consequences of 
conviction may be even more serious, as when (as was apparently a 
possibility in this case) the impecunious medical student finds himself 
barred from the practice of medicine because of a conviction he is unable 
to appeal for lack of funds.  Moreover, the State’s long-term interest 
would not appear to lie in making access to appellate processes from even 
its most inferior courts depend upon the defendant’s ability to pay.239 
It would seem anomalous or inconsistent, then, to conclude that even 
though equal protection precludes a state court from denying an indigent 
misdemeanant access to the record necessary for an adequate appeal240—
even when that defendant is not facing incarceration—the same court would 
be free to deny that defendant (before he is deemed guilty) access to a 
lawyer to provide her with a meaningful adjudication. 
The access to courts line of cases makes clear that, in the context of this 
fundamental right, individuals cannot be treated differently on the basis of 
wealth.  From that perspective, the problem with the Argersinger-Scott 
formulation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is that indigent 
defendants may not have access to counsel in cases where a meaningful 
defense is important or needed.  It exacerbates this inequality by 
empowering the prosecutor and the judge to divest the defendant of the 
right to meaningful access.  It is telling that five Justices on the Scott Court 
at some point recognized or foreshadowed the equal protection problems 
posed by the actual incarceration standard:  Justices Powell and Rehnquist 
in Argersinger241 and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in Scott.242  
 
 238. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196–97. 
 239. Id. at 197. 
 240. See id. at 198 (“We conclude that appellant cannot be denied a ‘record of sufficient 
completeness’ to permit proper consideration of his claims.”). 
 241. Although the problems identified in some opinions related to the distinction based on 
incarceration rather than the one based on wealth, the two are related.  Those who can afford 
to hire private counsel are not subject to the variances in protection that come about as a 
result of the Court’s incarceration-based standard. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 
54 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The new rule announced today also could result in equal 
protection problems.  There may well be an unfair and unequal treatment of individual 
defendants, depending on whether the individual judge has determined in advance to leave 
open the option of imprisonment.  Thus, an accused indigent would be entitled in some 
courts to counsel while in other courts in the same jurisdiction an indigent accused of the 
same offense would have no counsel.  Since the services of counsel may be essential to a fair 
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As predicted, indigent defendants facing misdemeanor charges today 
experience a different criminal justice system than their wealthier cohorts. 
B.  Equal Protection and the Right to a Lawyer 
in Misdemeanor Cases 
As described above, there are two lines of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
applicable to indigent misdemeanor defendants seeking representation in 
state court.  The first, from the Argersinger-Scott line of cases under the 
Sixth Amendment, offers them only selective protection—if they cannot 
afford a lawyer, they are only entitled to one if they are incarcerated upon 
conviction.  The second, from Griffin, Douglas, and the subsequent cases 
discussed, suggests due process and equal protection require that, regardless 
of what is at stake, defendants without financial means cannot be deprived 
of elements of an adequate or meaningful defense to which those with 
means would have access.243  Interwoven among the latter group of cases is 
the recognition that while the consequences of such deprivation may range 
in severity—from a fine or loss of a license to incarceration—even the least 
severe of consequences should not turn on the ability to pay.  Together, 
these cases suggest that states cannot operate a dual criminal justice system 
for which the assignment to one track or the other turns on a defendant’s 
wealth.  If the concern about such inequality is not limited to the 
individual’s entitlement to a lawyer but also extends to the fact that poor 
and wealthier defendants are being treated differently with respect to basic 
procedural protections, the equal access to justice framework may provide a 
better metric for evaluating indigent defense systems than the Sixth 
Amendment. 
The Supreme Court has generally tolerated discrimination based on 
wealth, applying only rational basis review.244  Even so, it has specifically 
recognized an exception—encompassing cases like Griffin and Douglas—
where defendants are “completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, 
and as a consequence, they sustain[] an absolute deprivation of a 
meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.”245  In Bearden v. Georgia,246 
 
trial even in cases in which no jail sentence is imposed, the results of this type of pretrial 
judgment could be arbitrary and discriminatory.”). 
 242. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 383 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
‘authorized imprisonment’ test presents no problems of administration.  It avoids the 
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before trial and the attendant problems of inaccurate predictions, unequal treatment, and 
apparent and actual bias.  These problems with the ‘actual imprisonment’ standard were 
suggested in my Brother Powell’s concurrence in Argersinger, which was echoed in 
scholarly criticism of that decision.” (citation omitted)). 
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 245. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20 (discussing Griffin and Douglas as examples).  The 
Rodriguez Court also took note of Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), and Tate v. 
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), in which the Court struck down criminal penalties subjecting 
defendants to incarceration based solely on their inability to pay a fine. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
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relying on previous precedents such as Williams v. Illinois247 and Tate v. 
Short,248 the Court held that indigent defendants may not be incarcerated 
based solely on the inability to pay a fine.249  Thus, there is a compelling 
and deep line of precedent standing for the principle that poor defendants 
cannot be deprived of a meaningful defense simply because they cannot 
afford to hire an attorney. 
Although not as apparent among more recent right to counsel cases, 
equal protection—and, more specifically, the notion that treatment of those 
in the criminal justice system should not be dependent on the ability to 
pay—is resurging.  Money bail practices have come under fire from the 
courts for their ability to incarcerate only those who are unable to post 
bond.250  Similarly, some have successfully attacked the overuse of fines 
and fees as a means for incarcerating the poor.251 
A stark example of equal protection’s value in this context can be found 
in state court in Miami, Florida.  Under Florida law, indigent defendants 
charged with an offense punishable by incarceration are entitled to counsel 
unless the court enters an Order of No Incarceration (ONI) at least fifteen 
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days before trial.252  This system, consistent with the Argersinger-Scott line 
of cases, effectively grants Miami prosecutors control over the right to 
counsel for indigent misdemeanor defendants.  Prosecutors routinely seek 
and obtain ONIs from the courts to remove the public defender.  And when 
the judge enters such an order, the defendant is no longer entitled to the 
appointment of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.  Many judges grant 
ONIs without any independent review of the case or review of whether 
removing counsel would substantially disadvantage the defendant, as 
required under Florida law.253  In this way, defendants are frequently 
stripped of public defenders that have spent weeks, even months, preparing 
a case.254  This tactic provides prosecutors an enormous advantage over a 
defendant, who, having proclaimed his innocence throughout the 
proceedings, must now confront the State alone.  Unlike Scott, whose 
decision to challenge his fate resulted in a Supreme Court decision, many 
defendants simply give up and take a plea bargain.255 
The defendants convicted under this system often face fates worse than 
jail.  They may be deported.  They may lose their homes.  They may lose 
their jobs.  And they may suffer all of these hardships without any warning 
that accepting a seemingly generous plea offer could ruin their lives or 
livelihoods.  Yet, under the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, they 
have all been treated fairly.  After all, their convictions are “reliable” 
enough to justify the devastation that follows.  By contrast, this practice 
could not stand under an equal protection or due process analysis.  The 
Miami system essentially prices people out of their right to a fair 
adjudication.  Whatever one thinks about the reliability of convictions 
resulting from this system, it offends the notions of equal dignity and due 
process that we seek to elevate. 
To be clear about the equal protection concern animating this Article, we 
are concerned primarily with distinctions based on wealth given the Court’s 
recognition that a criminal defendant’s access to the courts cannot turn on 
his or her relative means.  While there is another potential equal protection 
distinction to be made between those defendants sentenced to incarceration 
and those who are not—a concern animating positions like Justice Powell’s 
concurrence in Argersinger—that is not our focus.  We acknowledge that 
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whether a defendant has meaningful access to the courts is not wholly 
divorced from consequences:  what is necessary to provide meaningful 
access may look quite different for a defendant facing the death penalty 
than for a defendant facing a light fine.  The difference is that meaningful 
access is not principally about outcomes.  It is more fundamentally about 
the fairness of the process by which those outcomes are determined and 
whether that process is fair for all.256  It is unlikely that these fairness and 
equality concerns can be accommodated by a distinction based strictly on 
the sentence ultimately imposed. 
Also, as described immediately above, these two equal protection 
arguments—based on wealth and incarceration—are often connected.  It is 
only those defendants who cannot afford to hire an attorney whose access to 
counsel (and thus meaningful access to the courts) is subject to control by 
the prosecutor or the judge—should one of those parties choose to eliminate 
incarceration as an option, a defendant will no longer be entitled to counsel.  
This is why we argue that under the existing system, the most effective way 
to satisfy equal protection is to ensure that all defendants charged with 
criminal offenses are afforded meaningful access, which includes the 
assistance of counsel.  As described in Part III.C, this approach does not 
necessarily require the appointment of counsel in every criminal case—at 
least not in all cases currently defined as criminal.  A better approach would 
be to assess which offenses truly warrant the appointment of counsel to 
guarantee meaningful access.  We ultimately conclude that the full 
decriminalization of certain lower-level offenses where counsel is required 
by the access to courts line of cases but economically prohibitive is both the 
most pragmatic and constitutionally sound solution to the pernicious 
problem of assembly line justice in misdemeanor courts. 
C.  Toward an Equal-Protection-Driven Solution 
As described above, from the perspective of equal access to courts, the 
right to counsel analysis shifts from whether the criminal trial results in 
incarceration to whether counsel is necessary for the individual to mount a 
meaningful defense to the conviction itself.  Understood this way, 
guaranteeing meaningful access in practice would require a two-step 
process.  The first step would be to recognize that, for the reasons described 
above, counsel is constitutionally required in all misdemeanor cases, or at 
least for those defendants for whom significant consequences beyond 
incarceration are at stake.  As noted above, however, most indigent defense 
systems are already delinquent in providing effective assistance of counsel; 
expanding the number of cases in which counsel must be provided would 
likely exacerbate these deficiencies.257  As John King has explained, the 
 
 256. See Lucas, supra note 40, at 1221 (noting the Gideon Court’s emphasis on both 
substantive and procedural fairness). 
 257. See Hashimoto, supra note 194, at 513 (noting that, in a world of limited resources, 
states that choose to provide representation to all indigent defendants will provide only 
“minimal” representation); Natapoff, supra note 57, at 160 (“[T]he legal system already 
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“mere presence of defense counsel . . . will not . . . solve the problem.”258  
In misdemeanor courts across the county, even where counsel is provided, 
the attorneys assigned to such cases are “overworked, under-experienced, 
and often incompetent”; they often lack adequate time to see their clients or 
prepare their cases and fail to conduct adequate investigations, undertake 
required research, or file appropriate motions.259  These deficiencies are 
overwhelmingly the result of systemic failures, such as underfunding, rather 
than the fault of individual attorneys.260 
To mitigate these difficulties, the second step would require 
decriminalization of “petty” or low-level offenses261:  once certain offenses 
are no longer criminal, the need for counsel disappears.262  Though drawing 
any line will always demarcate the haves from the have-nots, setting the 
line between those who are charged with criminal offenses and those who 
are not is more defensible than one based on incarceration, given the 
significant direct and collateral costs of conviction.  More importantly, such 
a line guarantees equal treatment for all criminal defendants, and 
decriminalization offers a way for states to meet the capacity demands 
generated by that line.263  Rather than focusing strictly on the “supply side” 
of the representation equation (i.e., the number of lawyers necessary to 
defend those without means), states should also consider the “demand 
side,” lessening the number of cases for which a lawyer is required to 
 
underenforces existing protections; in light of limited resources, ramping up existing 
procedures may have little practical effect.”). 
 258. King, supra note 99, at 42. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See, e.g., id. at 43 (“Even in that universe of cases requiring court-appointed counsel, 
the system has utterly failed to provide a robust and zealous defense for those accused of 
crimes.”). 
 261. We acknowledge the concern that redefining crimes as civil violations may leave 
people facing significant financial penalties without the right to counsel typically available in 
criminal prosecutions.  While that is a valid concern, it is less relevant here, as the 
misdemeanor defendants who are the main focus of this Article are already not entitled to 
counsel in spite of the fact that they are facing criminal charges. 
  As Charlie Gerstein and J.J. Prescott have argued, substituting civil enforcement 
tools for criminal prosecution of “public order” crimes would eliminate other process costs 
and unnecessary harm to defendants as well. Charlie Gerstein & J.J. Prescott, Process Costs 
and Police Discretion, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 268 (2015). 
 262. This Article does not address civil cases in which counsel may also be critical.  The 
Court’s most recent guidance with respect to the right to counsel in civil cases is Turner v. 
Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011), in which the Court held that “the Due Process Clause does not 
always require the provision of counsel in civil proceedings where incarceration is 
threatened.” Id. at 446.  Instead, the Court concluded, it “must take account of opposing 
interests, as well as consider the probable value of ‘additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards.’” Id. (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
 263. Decriminalization of some low-level offenses would also address, indirectly, the fact 
that many municipal courts, often the site of misdemeanor adjudication, serve as revenue 
collection centers.  The Department of Justice’s report on law enforcement practices in 
Ferguson, Missouri, for example, demonstrates the extent to which municipal courts use 
“judicial authority as [a] means to compel the payment of fines and fees” in violation of due 
process and equal protection requirements.  CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 145, at 3.  The 
issue of fines imposed for civil violations is, as mentioned above, also an important one. 
However, it is outside the scope of this Article. 
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achieve meaningful access.264  A demand-side approach can be 
accomplished through the full decriminalization of specific offenses.265  
This framework emphasizes a broader point:  before discussing right to 
counsel reform at any level, either with regard to improving enforcement of 
the existing right or expanding the right, it is worth exploring why the 
demand for counsel is so high. 
One last note on the interplay between courts and legislatures is worth 
keeping in mind.  While decriminalization is ultimately a legislative task, 
the legal standards implemented by the Court often force legislative change.  
Thus, the first step of our proposal is directed to the judicial branch as well 
as the legislative branch, while the second step would clearly be a task for 
legislatures.  As Justice Brennan noted in his Scott dissent: 
It may well be that adoption by this Court of an “authorized 
imprisonment” standard would lead state and local governments to re-
examine their criminal statutes.  A state legislature or local government 
might determine that it no longer desired to authorize incarceration for 
certain minor offenses in light of the expense of meeting the requirements 
of the Constitution.  In my view this re-examination is long overdue.  In 
any event, the Court’s “actual imprisonment” standard must inevitably 
lead the courts to make this re-examination, which plainly should more 
properly be a legislative responsibility.266 
Of course, the Court may be hesitant to reach the conclusion described 
herein, in part because of the fiscal ramifications for the state in providing 
 
 264. One issue often raised with solutions based in equal protection is whether equality is 
best achieved by “leveling up” and providing more benefits to those previously excluded or 
“leveling down” to remove benefits from those previously favored.  This concern is a 
nonissue here, as forbidding a defendant from retaining counsel would be plainly 
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment.  Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, 
although equal protection has been emphasized throughout, the right of meaningful access to 
courts described in Part III.A is not based solely in equal protection but also in due process. 
See Lucas, supra note 40, at 1221–27 (describing the basis of the access to courts line of 
jurisprudence in both equal protection and due process); see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 
12, 17 (1956) (“Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our 
entire judicial system—all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 
‘stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court.’” (quoting Chambers 
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940))).  The due process component of the access to courts 
line of cases guarantees a floor and makes clear that the equal protection dilemma can only 
be resolved in one direction. 
 265. Another possible alternative is statutorily eliminating incarceration and probated or 
suspended sentences for certain classes of misdemeanor defendants.  See, e.g., Hashimoto, 
supra note 214, at 1042 (“Shelton, dependent as it is on the defendant’s sentence, offers 
states a low-cost way to comply with the Constitution:  eliminate incarceration and probated 
sentences for low-level offenders.”).  This option would at least eliminate manipulation of 
the right to counsel at the whim of the judge and prosecutor.  However, while satisfactory 
under the Sixth Amendment, this alternative would do nothing to address the fact that in 
cases either where the complexities of the required legal defense were beyond the layman or 
severe consequences were still at stake from a conviction (including the stigma of the 
conviction itself), most defendants would benefit significantly from legal representation.  In 
such cases, a defendant who was able would certainly hire private counsel.  Thus, this option 
would continue to condition meaningful access on wealth. 
 266. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 388–89 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also 
supra note 216. 
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all defendants with meaningful access.  As Justice Brennan also noted, 
however, the “Court’s role in enforcing constitutional guarantees for 
criminal defendants cannot be made dependent on the budgetary decisions 
of state governments.”267  Thus, while pragmatic considerations may 
influence the Court, it must remain focused on what is right from the 
perspective of law and justice, not fiscal limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Amendment has largely occupied the field in defining the 
states’ obligation to provide appointed counsel.268  Given that the Sixth 
Amendment is the only constitutional provision that explicitly references 
the right to counsel, this might appear logical.  There are, however, practical 
and conceptual advantages to invoking equal protection as a means to 
challenge a state’s failure to provide counsel to those accused of crimes.  
On a conceptual level, equal protection demands a different focus:  rather 
than emphasizing the presence of a lawyer and debating the relative 
effectiveness of counsel, as the Sixth Amendment does, equal protection 
centers attention on the fact that people are being denied meaningful access 
to the criminal justice system because of their relative wealth.  It thus 
prompts us to think not about redrawing the line between groups of 
defendants but about what can be done to avoid drawing a line among them 
at all.  For this reason, challenges rooted in equal protection often call for 
systemic reform rather than the vindication of individual rights.269  States 
faced with an equal protection challenge must either justify their choice to 
engage in such systemic deprivation or alter the nature of how their system 
provides benefits to indigents. 
While Gideon promised equal treatment of defendants too poor to hire 
their own attorney, that promise has been—and continues to be—denied to 
many defendants, including Aubrey Scott.  By reclaiming the potential of 
the access to courts line of jurisprudence, we are hopeful that those who 
have been left behind can find a new means for challenging systemic 
indigent defense failures and bring Gideon’s promise from theory to reality. 
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